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Introduction 
FREDERICK F. ANSCOMBE 
T he papers presented in this volume operate in the widening gap between the recent trajectory of Ottoman studies and a continuing path of Bal- 
kan historical studies. Over the past two decades a number of Ottomanists 
have published studies which challenge, with varying degrees of success, 
the assumptions and conclusions crafted by previous generations of noted 
scholars. One of the shibboleths to come under concerted attack is the old 
notion of a long Ottoman "decline" beginning in 1566, the year of Siiley- 
man the Magnificent's death.l While some Ottomanists continue to debate 
a more appropriate date to mark the onset of "decline," it now seems ac- 
ceptable among others to question the very notion of decline at any point 
in the empire's history. Such developments in the field of Ottoman history 
seem to have had less impact upon Balkan studies than might be expected, 
however. Although there are now very promising junior scholars in several 
countries of southeastern Europe who approach the Ottoman period with 
open minds, and some admirable work of high quality and nuance has been 
published since the end of the Cold War,2 much of what has been produced 
concerning the Ottoman period still seems restricted by the conventions of 
"national" history and too often ignores Ottoman sources, let alone recent 
work in the wider field of Ottoman studies. It is significant that perhaps the 
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most noted work of Ottoman Balkan history to appear in recent years was 
a reissue of L. S. Stavrianos's monumental The Balkans Since 1453, origi- 
nally published in 1958, a book meticulous in tracing national histories of 
certain (generally Christian) groups but less so with Muslims, particularly 
any who could fall into the broad category of "Turk~."~ They are the eternal 
interlopers, regardless of how many generations of them were born, lived, 
and died in southeastern Europe, the dead wood obscuring the view of the 
(national) forest. 
The tenacity of the "Ottoman period as X centuries of darkness for na- 
tion y" paradigm is reflected also in recent works which have attempted to 
explain southeastern Europe to a wide audience, drawn to the region by the 
recent wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration. Robert Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts is 
the best-known of these. In a sense, the history recounted in Balkan Ghosts 
is rubbish (dangerously so, since the author writes compellingly- suspicion 
remains strong that President Bill Clinton long delayed American interven- 
tion in theYugoslav wars because Kaplan's book taught him that oppression, 
murder, rape, and pillage were just Balkan traditions from time irnmemo- 
rial). Yet, in another sense, Balkan Ghosts is quite illuminating, because 
Kaplan talked to people in the region and simply parrots the popular beliefs 
drummed into them from an early age by aggressively nation-building sc- 
hool curricula, literature, and f~ lk lore .~  Misha Glenny, another journalist, 
performs a similar service in his book The Balkans, 1804-1999 by retelling 
the grisly tales drawn from published works on the history of southeastern 
E u r ~ p e . ~  Works by academics are not necessarily any more rigorous in their 
search for evidence and interpretation. Andre Gerolymatos recently pub- 
lished a study of the roots of that supposedly endemic Balkan tendency to 
war in which he proved himself just as ready to revel in bloodthirsty (but 
often apocryphal) stories of the Turkish yoke as did Kaplan and Glenny. 
While Gerolymatos does occasionally acknowledge the existence of recent 
scholarship challenging the old Balkan paradigm of the Ottomans, he does 
not use any of it to challenge the myths he prefers. "[Nationalist] folklore so 
often distorts the historical reality. But that doesn't mean that myths and le- 
gends offer no insights into the past."6 Yet unsubtle folklore more clearly of- 
fers insights into present beliefs rather than past "reality," and G e r ~ l y m ~ t ~ ~ ' ~  
implication that the Yugoslav wars of disintegration can be blamed upon the 
Ottoman yoke seems, itself, both simplistic and ahistorical. 
Those readers afraid of drowning in my personal pool of pessimism will 
no doubt welcome a lifeline. As stated before, there are scholars in southe- 
astern Europe who, having been freed of the old Marxist straitjacket, are 
now more than ready to test assumptions of this remaining pillar of history 
under the old regimes, nationalism. They face daunting challenges, inclu- 
ding the financial and other problems besetting the educational systems in 
most of these countries. Even in North America, where a dissertation on the 
Ottoman Balkans all too often serves as a one-way ticket out of acade~nia,~ 
at least a few researchers have been open to new ideas about the Ottoman 
period. At the same time as the Gerolymatos book appeared, Demis Hupc- 
hick published a survey of Balkan history. It included the following assess- 
ment of "decline ." 
Historians traditionally characterize the period beginning with 
the death of Suleyman I in 1566 and extending through the eigh- 
teenth century as one of Ottoman decline. The word "decline" 
implies that factors inherent to the Ottomans' society led to its 
gradual deterioration, with deleterious effects on the empire's in- 
ternal administration, its international position, and the condition 
of its assorted subjects. Ottoman society's institutions, [which 
functioned so well for 250 years] . . . did slowly begin to unra- 
vel following the mid-sixteenth century. Little evidence exists, 
however, to suggest that they did so on their own account and 
of their own accord. Compounding forces exerted by the Otto- 
mans' Western European antagonists primarily were responsible 
for that development. Rather than "decline", it is more accurate to 
speak of Ottoman internal "destabilization", a result of consistent 
external, Western European economic and military-technological 
pressures. Either way, the period left a lasting negative legacy on 
the empire's Balkan  subject^.^ 
Just as Hupchick has considered recent additions to Ottoman historiog- 
raphy, it behooves Ottomanists to think carefully about the quotation abo- 
ve. While the old long-decline paradigm needed revision, it would be just 
as misguided to overlook the fact that many parts of the empire endured 
extended periods of turmoil in the second half of the eighteenth and the 
first decades of the nineteenth centuries. This era saw large-scale Christian 
uprisings (the first not prompted by the approach of foreign armies since the 
fifteenth century), of Serbs in 1804 and of Greeks in 1821. It also witnes- 
sed the violent overthrow and deaths of two sultans, Selim I11 and Mustafa 
IV in 1807-8. This extended turmoil ushered in and legitimated the age of 
rapid, far-reaching reforms, begun symbolically by the destruction of the 
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Janissary corps in 1826. Difficult times afflicted many Ottoman provinces, 
and several excellent studies of conditions in Arab lands in the eighteenth 
century have appeared over the past fifteen years.9 Much less has been pub- 
lished about southeastern Europe, in spite of the importance of the Balkan 
provinces as the leading area of enduring concern for the sultan's govern- 
ment and as the staging ground for the most unsettling developments of the 
period. 
The studies collected in this volume are intended to improve Ottoma- 
nists' knowledge of conditions in a crucial part of the empire in crisis, and to 
add detailed pictures to the often sketchy information available to Balkanists 
interested in pre-nation-state history. The authors have picked issues which 
arose in different areas of the Balkans during this period, analyzed the roots 
of the problems and, where possible, assessed Ottoman authorities' attempts 
to resolve them. Several articles presuppose some background knowledge 
on the part of the reader, but others should be readily comprehensible to 
undergraduate students and educated general readers. For all, it is hoped that 
these studies will lead to a greater appreciation of the complexities of the 
Ottoman empire in the eighteenth century, of "decline," and of the exhaus- 
tive reform efforts of the nineteenth century. 
Several common points of interest arise in the papers, suggesting the ty- 
pes of issues that should have concerned the Ottoman authorities the most. 
As in most pre-modern states, the Ottoman government of the eighteenth 
century had only a few basic purposes, beyond boosting the status and we- 
alth of its principle figures: to deliver justice and peace within the realm, 
to wage war against foreign enemies (by this period more often wars of 
defense, fought on Ottoman territory, rather than wars of offense), and to 
raise the revenue necessary to carry out these tasks effectively. It is thus no 
surprise to see that the issues of concern generally fall into these categories. 
Not a surprise, perhaps, but distinctly alarming, since problems in these 
areas would affect major pillars of Ottoman legitimacy. 
Two papers concern principally questions of justice and the application 
of law. Michael Hickok's exploration of issues involved in the investigation 
of murders in Bosnia makes clear that Ottoman central and provincial aut- 
horities had multiple avenues by which they could approach the crime of 
murder, following sharia, kanun, and customary law. Judge and governor 
could choose the approach which best met the state's interest in each case. 
In his analysis of several incidents of murder in Karaferye (Greece), Antonis 
Anastasopoulos echoes Hickok on this point and stresses that the state did 
retain its longstanding interest in seeing justice done, even in the chaotic 
years of this period, and that the subjects of the sultan had enough faith in 
this state interest to continue to apply to Istanbul for justice. The old system 
still functioned. 
Yet in all of the papers of this volume there are at least hints of problems 
in the legal system. Hickok, Virginia Aksan, and Rossitsa Gradeva all refer 
to the intrusion of foreign policy into the arena of administration of justice, 
adding to the avenues of legal approach identified by Hickok. A lengthening 
menu of such approaches offered flexibility to Ottoman authorities, but it 
also offered opportunities to clever transgressors, of whom killers seeking 
to avoid blood retribution (expected under customary law) by moving to 
areas more clearly ruled by sharia in Bosnia offer but one example. The rise 
of foreign influence and international legal principles could well complicate 
further legal questions in the empire, as it was to do in extreme form in the 
nineteenth century, when many non-Muslim Ottoman subjects came to en- 
joy legal immunities under the capitulations regime.1° The use of differing 
legal principles even in this earlier period increased the likelihood of conf- 
lict between officers of the government, who could well disagree over the 
choice of legal approach. Since kadzs had only limited resources at their dis- 
posal to impose justice, such conflict and division could be very damaging. 
Indeed, Hickok notes that orders from Istanbul seemed to mandate much 
less active cooperation between kadz and vali by the end of the eighteenth 
century, in comparison to the 1750s. 
When local and central authorities proved unable to craft a strong, unifi- 
ed response to legal challenges, the administration of justice could crumble 
quickly. Gradeva's and my papers focus upon well-armed groups of varying 
sizes that were able to defy divided local authorities. Distracted by external 
threats and weakened by losses in the wars of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, Istanbul could muster neither the will nor the material 
means necessary to ensure the maintenance of justice and the application 
of law in the provinces. At best, the government could only hope to restrict 
"banditry" to its most hospitable bases, the frontier areas of the Danube and 
rough terrain such as Albania. While the justice system still offered hope to 
individuals in relatively well controlled areas such as Karaferye and central 
Bosnia, truly ambitious criminals could thrive in the mountains and in the 
borderlands. 
Questions of taxation and the related issue of land tenure complicated 
Ottoman efforts to reimpose peace and justice in the Balkans. Ottoman re- 
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cords contain many complaints about excessive taxation, but in a sense such 
grievances were normal and could be managed. The avaricious tax collector 
is a well-known figure worldwide. Where the justice system continued to 
function, such wrongs could be redressed (as in the case of Ali Riigdi Efendi 
cited by Anastasopoulos). A more serious problem emerges in this period, 
however, because more taxes were deemed illegal per se. In the case of 
Osman Pazvantoglu, whose virtually impregnable position in Vidin is anal- 
yzed at length by Gradeva, it is clear that this rebellious officer of the sultan 
attracted widespread support from both Muslims and Christians due to his 
attitude toward new taxes, introduced by Sultan Selim I11 to pay for military 
reforms. The introduction of an array of taxes and other innovations unsan- 
ctioned by religious law undercut the moral authority of the sultan among 
Muslims, further weakening his loyal representatives' ability to promote 
justice among an unsettled population. 
That much of the population lived in uncertain circumstances is refle- 
cted in the high incidence of land disputes. In some areas peasants fled or 
were pushed off the land en masse, as armies and brigand gangs criss-cros- 
sed the Balkans. Few parts of the peninsula escaped these phenomena, alt- 
hough some areas recovered from the disruptions relatively quickly." Other 
territories, especially border regions such as Vidin, Little Wallachia, and 
Serbia, were lastingly affected, as Aksan and Gradeva show. The majority 
of peasants involved there were Christians, and those who most often took 
advantage of the chaos to seize lands were Muslim military men. In the- 
se areas the Janissaries themselves were often recent migrants, driven out 
of lost border fortresses, very badly paid, and in all likelihood inclined to 
a feeling of entitlement vis-d-vis the distrusted Orthodox peasantry. They 
perhaps foreshadow the later refugees from Black Sea territories conquered 
by Russia, who are generally blamed for the excessive ferocity with which 
the relatively minor Bulgarian uprising of 1876 was crushed. As in issues of 
taxation, during times of peace the central and provincial authorities were 
able to keep extralegal land seizures by Janissaries and ayan under some 
degree of control, as Aksan and I show, but the pressures of war and its af- 
termath loosened that restraint. In these periods relations between Muslims 
and zimmis, which never really recovered from the shocks of the long war 
of 1683-99, were probably at their tensest. Christians dreaded lawlessness 
and scapegoating, while Muslims feared the appearance of Christian hay- 
dud bands in their midst, even though they rarely posed a serious threat to 
state or regional, rather than local, stability. It is instructive to consider the 
actions of both Christians and Muslims in the Serbian "rebellion" of 1804: 
it started out as a campaign to assist in the reimposition of the sultan's jus- 
tice and law over the local Janissary bands and became an open revolt only 
when Istanbul's troops turned on their erstwhile Christian allies following 
the defeat of the Janissaries. Christian military bands stirred deep unease. 
In all of the issues mentioned so far, it is clear that war added enormous- 
ly to the strains upon the Ottoman system in the Balkans. This was always 
the case, but in this period the frequency and duration of conflict (1768-74, 
1787-92, 1799-1802, 1804-12, 1821-30) was exceptional, with the stres- 
ses compounded by Ottoman defeat in all of these wars. The reasons for 
that string of defeats - military "decline," or something more complex? -is 
worthy of a volume of papers in its own right, but the bad effect of those 
losses on Ottoman provincial life is undeniable. Is Hupchick thus right to 
attribute Ottoman "destabilization" to "consistent external, Western Euro- 
pean economic and military-technological pressures?" It is certainly a de- 
fensible assertion. As it had in previous centuries, the empire held doggedly 
to a handful of cardinal principles, as in the field of law and justice, but 
showed flexibility in the means used to achieve desired results. To speak 
of "decline" in a system which was never truly static or "mature" is indeed 
misleading. Given time, the empire presumably still could have repaired 
weaknesses which grew apparent in key areas such as the military and taxa- 
tion. Yet time was a luxury of bygone years. The formerly leisurely adopti- 
on and adaptation of methods practiced by earlier regimes had to give way 
to a regimented quick-march-in short, to "reform" as finally introduced 
by Sultan Mahmud I1 and carried on through the rest of the existence of the 
empire. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that every regime in Europe 
was facing similar pressures to improve its military and boost the strength 
of the state. In this period practically every part of mainland Europe, from 
the Iberian peninsula to France to Italy to Russia, faced the threat or reality 
of revolts and revolutions, and many thought the Habsburg empire just as 
destined for demise as the Ottoman. Hupchick traces the period of crisis in 
the Ottoman Balkans to pressure from western Europe, but it is also rea- 
sonable to say that the Ottoman position on the periphery of the continent 
delayed by several decades each step of its inevitable confrontation with the 
European revolution in state and military power.12 
Comparison with developments elsewhere in Europe is but one area in 
which there remains much scope for research.13 None of the contributors to 
this volume chose to study a topic drawn from the period between the fall of 
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Selim 111 and the formal recognition of an independent Greece. The back- 
ground and course of the Serbian and Greek revolts, for example, would 
be well worth researching in Ottoman records but generally have been left 
oddly untouched. It is hoped that the studies presented here will not only 
help to bridge the gap between Ottomanist/Middle Eastern and Balkanist 
historiographies but also encourage more historians from both traditions to 
fill in these and the many other remaining lacunae. 
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